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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the impacts of the reform in the rural pension system in Brazil in 1991 on
schooling and health indicators. In addition, we use the reform to investigate the validity of the unitary
model of household allocation by testing if there were uneven impacts on those indicators depending on
the gender of the recipient. The main conclusion of the paper is that the reform had signiﬁcantly positive
eﬀects on the outcomes of interest, especially on those co-residing with a male pensioner, indicating that
the unitary model is not a well-speciﬁed framework to understand family allocation decisions. The
highest impacts were on school attendance for boys, literacy for girls and illness for middle-age people.
We explore a collective model as deﬁned by Chiappori (1992) as one possible alternative representation
for the decision-making process of the poor rural Brazilian families. In the cooperative Nash equilibrium,
the reform eﬀects can be divided into two pieces: a direct income eﬀect and bargaining power eﬀect. The
data support the existence of these two diﬀerent eﬀects. [JEL=O15, I12, I28]
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Princeton University for comments and suggestions. All remaining mistakes are mine.
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11 Introduction
In the past decades, the economic literature has shown evidence that the household cannot
be characterized as a unit with individuals sharing the same preferences or pooling their
resources. Within the family unit diﬀerent individuals may have diﬀerent concerns about
how to spend their total family income and the decision-making process of the resource
allocation may be aﬀected by the diﬀerence in preferences. This paper intends to take
advantage of variation in social security system rules in Brazil to estimate the impact of
a change in family income on socio-economic outcomes and uses that to investigate the
decision-making process of the aﬀected families.
Fully understanding the decision process is important in order to make better and more
eﬃcient transfer policies. Using the unitary model of the household as a guideline for policy
prescriptions may be misleading, since the eﬀect of public transfers may diﬀer depending on
the identity of the income recipient. Therefore, targeting transfers to the household may not
result in the desired consequences, given that transfers directed to the head of the family,
to the spouse or to elderly people may have diﬀerent impacts over the family. For example,
if the receiver of the transfer were an elderly person, there could be a larger fraction of the
transfer allocated to health care. In the same way, if the beneﬁciary were the mother instead
of the father, the income augment might cause a reduction on her labor supply, since she
might now want to allocate more of her time raising the children. Hence, an increase in the
family income may have uneven impacts on diﬀerent members of the household depending
on the characteristics of the transfer recipient.
In many developing countries, the pension system is the most important source of public
transfers to poor families. Therefore, a major change in the rules of the social security
system in a continental country is an excellent opportunity to understand how income is
allocated within household members. We will take advantage of the Brazilian social security
reform that occurred in 1991 to measure the extent to which the impacts of an unanticipated
increase in pension income depend on the characteristics of the pensioner.
To many families, especially in rural Brazil, pensions are the only stable source of income,
even in households not headed by a pensioner. Indeed, a considerable number of household
units are formed by pensioners, adults and children. A change in the eligibility rules as well as
in the pension values may modify the balance of power over the allocation decisions in favor
of the pensioner’s preferences. Therefore, if the pensioner’s preferences about education,
health, and leisure are diﬀerent from those of other family members, the modiﬁcation in
2the social security system may cause a massive change in intra-household allocations. For
instance, if female pensioners are concerned more about children education, a change in the
pension rules that allows spouses to also be a recipient may cause an important boost in
schooling for children living with an elderly female. In this case, the impact would be even
higher than one caused by a male beneﬁciary. Thus, estimating uneven impacts of the reform
on diﬀerent family members creates a possibility to better understand how intra-household
allocations are designed. In this research, we plan to concentrate the analysis of the impact
of changes in the pension system rules on two diﬀerent outcomes: education and health.
Both issues are important to the design of policies with the goal of enhancing the quality of
life of poor families and reducing inequality in developing countries.
Since Becker published his seminal works1 on family behavior, there has been a great
number of theoretical and applied research interested in the analysis of intra-household
allocation. The neoclassical traditional view, the unitary model of intra-household allocation,
assumes that the family behaves as a single agent. An important implication of this model is
that the expenditure on family’s public good (e.g. children’s schooling, health, etc) depends
only on the total family income and redistribution of income among family members has
no eﬀect on the provision of the public good. The literature deﬁnes this property as a
“neutrality” result.2 As discussed by Ermisch (2003), the “neutrality” condition can be also
obtained even in a framework where individuals within a family have diﬀerent preferences
and are allowed to make distinct decisions about consumption. In this case, we have to
assume that individuals do not cooperate in making decisions, i.e., each member chooses his
contribution to the public good to maximize his own welfare, taking the contribution of the
other members as given and also that preferences are convex. In the case of interior solutions,
where each individual contributes a non-zero amount of public good and care only about the
private consumption and the total amount of public good, the “neutrality” condition holds.
Another characteristic of the non-cooperative outcome is the Pareto ineﬃciency.
On the other hand, in a cooperative Nash equilibrium, adults maximize their utility func-
tion constrained by given levels of utility achieved by the other adult members. Therefore,
the equilibrium should be Pareto-Eﬃcient, in the sense that in the equilibrium allocation
of public and private goods, no adult can be better oﬀ without making at least one of the
others worse oﬀ. This is called the “collective model” by Chiappori (1992). In this situation,
1See Becker (1964), Becker (1974) and Becker (1981).
2The main characteristics of the unitary model are also described in the common preference model where the family’s
members have identical preferences.
3for types of preferences usually assumed in economic analysis, a redistribution of resources
among the family members will potentially aﬀect the amount of public good, and it will
increase or decrease depending on the preferences of the receiving adult.3 The result works
as if there was an income sharing rule, i.e., each member has a share of the total family
income and chooses his contribution to the public good based on his own preferences and
the share of income. Chiappori (1992) interprets the share as a reﬂection of the bargaining
power within the family. Therefore, an increase in a member’s income will generate two
separate eﬀects: (i) a direct income eﬀect that increases the provision of the public good as
long as it is a normal good; (ii) a bargaining eﬀect which reinforces the income eﬀect if the
member who received the extra income has stronger preferences in favor of the public good
compared to the other members.
The empirical investigation about the unitary model of intra-household allocation is a
recurrent topic in the literature. A classic study by Thomas (1990) which also uses Brazilian
data, tests whether the mother’s unearned income has a diﬀerent impact on family health
than the father’s. He ﬁnds diﬀerential eﬀects for child survival, and thus rejects the neo-
classical model. He also observes that mothers favor their daughters, and fathers their sons
in terms of nutritional intakes. Duﬂo (2003) uses the South African social pension program
to study whether the impact of cash transfer on child nutritional status is aﬀected by the
gender of the recipient. The author claims that pensions received by women have an impact
on the anthropometrics status (height) of girls but little eﬀect on boys. However, she could
not ﬁnd a similar eﬀect for pensions received by men. Emerson and Souza (2007) study the
existence of uneven impacts of parent’s socio-economic characteristics on school attendance
and child labor for boys and girls. Their results show that the father’s characteristics such
as years of schooling, non-labor income, and the age he ﬁrst began working have a greater
impact on sons than on daughters while mother’s characteristics have are greater eﬀect on
daughters. Moreover, the authors ﬁnd that both non-labor income of mothers and fathers
aﬀect the son’s schooling attendance more than they aﬀect daughter’s attendance.
Delgado (1997) and Delgado (1999) descriptively report the impacts of the reform on
socio-economic indicators such as poverty, personal and regional income distribution and
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant reduction of poverty and income redistribution for families aﬀected by the
reform. Carvalho (2000) and Carvalho (2001) also focus on the 1991 Brazilian reform. He
3This result is sensitive to the utility function used. Bergstgrom and Cornes (1981) and Bergstgrom (1983) have shown that
when the preference of each member has the Gorman form, public good allocation in a cooperative equilibrium is independent
of income distribution and the “neutrality” property holds.
4studies the impact of the income variation caused by the social security changes on schooling
decisions, child labor, retirement decisions and labor market responses. In the ﬁrst paper,
the author ﬁnds a reduction in child labor for both girls and boys and positive impact on
schooling enrollment for both genders, but does not focus on intra-household allocation or
bargaining power. In the second paper, he also observes a reduction in the retirement age
among those aﬀected by the reform.
In summary, the literature from developing countries has used social security reforms to
investigate whether pension income is associated with better outcomes for individuals who
live with pensioners and to explore whether characteristics of pensioners aﬀect the allocation
of resources in the household. The restructuring in the Brazilian social security system
presents itself as a valuable opportunity to understand the individual and family responses
to unanticipated income shocks. This study intends to explore the exogenous variation in
income caused by the rural pension system reform in Brazil to estimate the impact on the
cited social outcomes (education and health). Our primary objective in this paper is to test
whether an extra amount of family income coming from the social security beneﬁts creates
uneven impacts on diﬀerent members depending on the gender of the beneﬁciary.
The empirical strategy consists of estimating whether the variation in income driven by
the social security reform generated a diﬀerent impact on the demand for the public goods
(schooling and health) depending on the gender of the eligible member, and also whether
the pension income was spent like any other non-pension income or not. If the “neutrality”
property holds, it is expected that the pension income is spent like income from any other
source and also that the gender of the pensioner will not be signiﬁcantly related to the
provision of the public good.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses about the dataset used in this
paper. Section 3 explains the details of the reform. Identiﬁcation strategies are discussed in
section 4. The results are analyzed in section 5 and show a positive impact on schooling and
health status for boys living with male pensioners suggesting that the unitary model is not
valid. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
The data used in this research come from the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domic´ ılios
(PNAD) database. The PNAD is an annual household survey, with sample size equal to
51/500 of the Brazilian population (about 100,000 households) and is designed to produce a
picture of the social-economic conditions of the Brazilian population. It covers all urban and
almost all rural areas, except the Amazon region. It has been conducted on a regular basis
since 1981 by IBGE (the Brazilian Census Bureau) except in years in which census data was
collected (1991 and 2000) and in 1994 when there was a budgetary crisis. PNAD contains
also extensive data on personal and household information. For each person, information
about age, schooling attendance, literacy, migration, labor participation, retirement and
income sources (including amounts) is available. Moreover, periodically questions about
some other special topics (the “Supplements”) are included in the survey. For instance, in
the 1970’s, questions about migration were included; in the 1980’s the special topics were
heath education, labor market and social security; in the 1990’s, migration, fertility and child
labor. To study the schooling outcomes (literacy and attendance), we will use the 1988, 1989
and 1990 PNAD’s for years before the reform took place (1991), and the 1992, 1993 and 1995
surveys for years after the reform. We will analyze the impact on children between 6 and
18 years old who live in rural areas. In the case of health indicators, we will use the PNAD
supplements’ information collected prior the reform (1986) and from one collected after the
reform (1988). Two indicators will be evaluated: reported illness and the search for any
health care service in the past two weeks prior to the interview. We study the eﬀects of the
reform on those two health indicators for diﬀerent subgroups (everyone, children - between
0 and 14 years old) and middle-age people - men between 40 and 55; and women between
40 and 50 years old).
3 The Reform
In October of 1988, the new Brazilian Constitution was promulgated. The Constitution
established many changes in the principles of the entire social security system. In addition,
it also determined that the Congress should approve Ordinary Laws, which should implement
all changes. The main guiding principles stipulated by the Constitution were: extension of
old-age beneﬁts to anyone who was not a household head; no beneﬁt should be smaller than
one minimum wage; reduction in the minimum age of old-age eligibility; length-of-service
eligibility to rural workers.4 The Congress passed the Ordinary Laws 5 on July 24 of 1991
4Beltrao et al. (2003) and Delgado (1997) have more details about the constitutional new rules concerning the rural pension
system.
5Laws # 8212 and 8213, available at
http://www010.dataprev.gov.br/sislex/paginas/42/1991/8212.htm
6and the reforms went into eﬀect. The new main rules sanctioned by the law were:
• New minimum age eligibility equal to 60 for men and 55 for women compared to 65
years for both men and women before the reform.
• Anyone who reached the minimum age requirement could be eligible in the household.
• The minimum beneﬁt was increased to 100% of the minimum wage.
• The value of the beneﬁt is calculated based on previous earnings against a ﬂat beneﬁt
of 50% of minimum wage before the reform.
• Length-of-service pension available after 30 years of services for men and 25 years for
women. The value of the beneﬁt is also calculated based on previous earnings.
Beyond minimum age, eligibility to a rural pension requires from the worker proof of
residence in a rural area and engagement in one of the rural activities deﬁned by the law
(farmers, ﬁshers, miners, loggers, etc.) for at least 60 months prior to the application.
Proving previous engagement in a rural activity was extremely easy, since many documents
were accepted as suﬃcient proof, such as individual labor contracts, tenancy contracts and
sharecropping agreement, among others.
Although the law stipulated an earning-based beneﬁt, the great majority of the rural
pensioners received the minimum wage at least until 1997 because almost all rural workers
did not keep a documented record of previous earnings. For instance, the average rural
beneﬁt paid in 1997 was around R$ 121, while the minimum wage was R$ 120. For the same
reason, the proportion of length-of-service retirees in the rural system is insigniﬁcant, less
than 0.1% of the total number of pensioners.6 Therefore, we do not worry about any kind
of endogeneity caused by diﬀerences in the value of the beneﬁt or in the age of retirement.
The increase in the minimum beneﬁt for the current pensioners was instantaneous. The
income of those who were pensioners in the old system doubled right after July of 1991.
However, for those who are now eligible or decided to apply after the change in the rules, the
entire process of registration took several months due to administrative delays. Therefore,
for the entire group of people who became eligible after the reform, the impact was not
automatic. Beside, since the worker should apply to be registered in the system, concerns
about selectivity bias, especially about the timing of the reform impacts, arise. Probably
http://www010.dataprev.gov.br/sislex/paginas/42/1991/8213.htm .
6Data from the social security administration.
7many newly eligible workers in a ﬁrst moment ignored the new rules of the system and it is
possible that unobservables correlated to the ignorance of the new rules are also correlated
with some outcome of interest. That is one of the reasons why we use datasets until 1995
in order to let the take-up process for the newly eligible complete. In our dataset, the
proportion of pensioners among the newly eligible before the reform was around 15%7 and
increases to 50% before stabilizing after 1995.
4 Identiﬁcation Strategies
Consistently estimating the eﬀect of income variations on diﬀerent family members is not a
simple task. Using disparity of income across families from a single cross-section may intro-
duce many identiﬁcation problems in the regressions. A family’s unobserved characteristics
might be correlated with family’s income and also with investment in schooling and health.
This situation could lead to several misinterpretations of the data. Based on the results of
such simple regressions, one could argue, for example, that an extra amount income would
imply an increase on schooling attendance, when, in reality, it is the intellectual level of
the parents, which is correlated with the family income, that drives the decision about the
child schooling. An exogenous source of income variation is a sine qua non condition for
having consistent and reliable results. Hence, the modiﬁcation in the Brazilian social secu-
rity system in 1991 is an excellent source of income variation to be explored, since it is not
correlated with any family unobserved characteristics.
However, using total income that comes from the beneﬁts or even a direct indicator if
the family has a person that is a pensioner is also problematic. The value received from the
pension (when it is not the minimum value) is derived from the past labor earnings and could
possibly also be correlated with unobservable characteristics. Directly including a dummy
variable indicating if the person is a pensioner might also generate inconsistent results, since
the decision to apply (and when to apply) to the beneﬁt could potentially be endogenous.
For instance, rich people might not be willing to go to a post oﬃce and stay in the line
in order to apply for the pension, since their extra income utility could not compensate
the burden of applying to the pension. In this case, a selectivity bias problem could arise.
Therefore, we will pursue a intent-to-treat approach, in which actual treatment is replaced
7This number is not zero probably because of migration of previous urban workers to rural areas or public employees who
have their own pension system.
8by eligibility in order to avoid the selectivity problem.8
Moreover, the use of variation across households in social security income to identify the
impact of earnings on social outcomes requires adequate control of the eﬀects of living with
an elderly person unrelated to their social security revenue. Families who co-reside with an
elderly person may diﬀer from other families for several reasons. Elderly people may have
diﬀerent preferences over the importance of children education compared to the other family
members, or concern more about their own health, or, in general, the presence of an elderly
person may be correlated with other unobserved characteristics that are also correlated
with the outcomes of interest. Therefore, from one single cross-section, it is impossible to
disentangle the direct income eﬀect of coming from the old-age pension from the impacts of
living with an elderly person. An exogenous reform in social security, however, permits the
separation of theses eﬀects.
Nevertheless, the comparison between the cross-sectional patterns of outcomes before
and after the reform would identify the eﬀect of the changes in social security income only
in the absence of any ongoing trend. In the presence of such trend a before and after
estimator would be upward or downward biased depending whether the trend is positive or
negative sloped. In order to control for the time trend eﬀect, we will use a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence approach. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator will be consistent as long as the
time variation on the outcome of interest would be the same for both treated and control
group in the absence of the treatment, i.e., only if both groups have the same time trend. If
the control group has a diﬀerent time pattern from the treated, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
estimator will be biased. Suppose Yit,0 and Yit,1 are, respectively, the outcomes for the non-
treated and treated individual i at time t and they are modeled by the following equations:
Yit,0 = βi,0 + δt,0 + it
Yit,1 = βi,1 + δt,1 + α + it.
where βi,. are the ﬁxed eﬀects, δt,. are the time eﬀects and α indicates the true eﬀect of the
treatment. Let t = b,a ((b)efore and (a)fter the treatment). For simplicity, we will assume
that δb,1 = δb,0 = 0. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator will only be unbiased if δa,1 = δa,0,
8Nonetheless, we will refer to families with an eligible people as the treated group.
9i.e., if both treated and control groups have the same time pattern.
E[αDD] = E[Yia,1 − Yib,1] − E[Yia,0 − Yib,0]








where e = 1 indicates if the individual has an elderly member in her family. More speciﬁcally,
we are assuming that the potential diﬀerence in the time trend of the treatment and control
group (∆e) does not come only from the treatment per se, but also from the presence of
an elderly person in the family. An unobservable shock could have aﬀected only families
with an elderly member in the same moment of the pension reform. Therefore, in order to
obtain an unbiased estimator of the true treatment eﬀect, we need a control group that has
an elderly member (e = 1), but was not aﬀected by the reform.
We plan to use families with an almost-eligible person – man between 55 years and 60
years old and/or women between 50 years and 55 years old– as the control group9 in order
to disentangle the true treatment eﬀect from the speciﬁc elderly trend eﬀect.
Furthermore, the reform is also an extraordinary opportunity to check whether the “neu-
trality” property characterizes the intra-household allocation process. Testing the validity
of the unitary model without an exogenous income variation may also lead to erroneous
conclusions. Most studies in the literature use only the variation across families of unearned
income in the hands of diﬀerent member (for example mothers and fathers) to identify the
allocation process within households. They usually regress the children outcomes (health,
schooling, anthropometrics, nutrient intakes, etc) on parent’s unearned income. By compar-
ing the coeﬃcient of each parent income, those studies gauge the consistency of the unitary
model. However, since the diﬀerence between unearned incomes of distinct members in the
family is not likely to be orthogonal to unobserved characteristics in the family that also
aﬀect the outcome of interest, the conclusion based on those estimated coeﬃcients may be
invalid. For instance, suppose families that depend more on unearned income care less (both
fathers and mothers) about education. In addition, it is possible that the fact that they need
more this extra money induces the member of the family who works to also search for these
alternative resources. In this case, the diﬀerence in unearned income between the working
9From now on, every time we refer to the control group, we will be mentioning about families with an almost-eligible member.
10and non-working member of the family would be higher for such families and could lead
to a spurious correlation with the outcome of interest. Since the income variation caused
by the reform was out of the family’s control and therefore orthogonal to any unobserved
characteristic that could be correlated to the provision of the public good, we will test the
validity of the unitary model by examining if the reform had uneven impacts on the outcome
of interest conditioning on the gender of the eligible person.
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where Y is the outcome of interest (explicitly, schooling and health indicators); T j (for both
j = (m)ale or (f)emale) is a binary variable which is 1 if individual’s family has the presence
of at least one eligible person in the new system rules [(T m) man 60 years or older or (T f)
woman 55 years or older], i.e., the “treated” group; C m,f indicates whether the individual
co-resides with at least one male (C m) or female (C f) almost-eligible person, i.e., if she is
part of the control group; W is a vector of household and personal characteristics such as
age, age squared10, education attainment of the head of household, head’s gender, age and
race, number of family members and number of children in family; Post is a dummy denoting
post-reform years (after 1991). T m, T f, Cm and Cf also enter in the equation interacted
with Post.
With this speciﬁcation and assuming a linear probability model, β
j
4 (the coeﬃcients of
the interaction terms between T j and Post) will be the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimators
of the treated against the reference group, which is, in this case, everyone who resides in
the rural areas and does not co-reside with an eligible or an almost-eligible person. β
j
4 is






5 allows us to check if β
j
4 are indeed capturing the reform eﬀect





5 is the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator when the comparison is the control group. In
this case, both treated and control groups have an elderly member in their family. Therefore,
10We also tried a speciﬁcation including dummies for each year of birth in order to capture any cohort eﬀect. The results
were qualitatively very similar to those presented here and are available upon request.
11Actually, in this speciﬁcation, β
j
4 is also capturing the eﬀect of the reduction in age eligibility. Below, we will disentangle
the outcome of those two change in the rural pension system.





consistently estimate the true treatment eﬀect.




Assuming that the direct income impact of the reform was uniform across families with
male and female pensioners, diﬀerence in the eﬀects on the provision of the public good
must be caused by changes in the bargaining power within the household. In other words, if
bargaining power has an important role on the allocation decisions, extra income given to men




4, violating the “neutrality” property and consequently rules out the unitary model
as a good speciﬁcation of the allocation process.
New × old eligibility
Since the decision about applying to the beneﬁt is potentially endogenous, the results based
on speciﬁcation (2) have to be carefully interpreted. As explained in section (3), the reduction
in the age eligibility does not guarantee an extra amount of income for families with a newly
eligible person right after the reform in the system. Depending on how important the extra
income is for the eligible member and her family, the decision of whether and when to apply
to the beneﬁt could be diﬀerent from family to family. And if the source of this “application”
heterogeneity was correlated to the outcome of interest, the result estimated would have to
be understood diﬀerently than if it was not the case. Each β
j
4 in equation 2 captures the
average impact of the reform on the entire group of potentially “treated” families.
Moreover, even disregarding the possible heterogeneity problem exposed above, work with
just one treatment eﬀect could create another problem, since the impact of the reform on
families with a newly eligible was diﬀerent on those with an old eligible member. More
speciﬁcally, for those families that have a newly eligible member who now receives the mini-
mum beneﬁt, the amount of beneﬁt received was zero before and increased to one minimum
wage after the reform. On the other hand, for those who were already beneﬁciaries, the
reform impact was half as much as on the ﬁrst group. Therefore, again, β
j
4 would capture
an “average” eﬀect that could underestimate or overestimate the true impact on each one of
those two treatment groups.
In order to disentangle the eﬀect of the increase in the minimum beneﬁts and the change















































i s are: (k = 1) the presence of an individual eligible in the old system rules – 65
years or older person – this term captures the impact of the increase in the minimum beneﬁts
values from 50% of the minimum wage to 100% of it.; (k = 2) the presence of a newly eligible
individual in the new system rules (between 60 years and 65 years old for men or between
55 years and 65 years old for women) this term also captures the eﬀect of reduction in the
age requirement.




4,k=2 will be, respectively, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimators









5 allows us to check if the eﬀect is coming from the reform or a speciﬁc characteristic
of families with elderly people.






4,k=2 indicates the unitary model validity.
5 Results
Impacts on Income
Before attempting to measure any eﬀect of the changes of the pension system on social-
economic outcomes, it is important to be sure that the social security reform has an impact
on families’ total income in rural areas.
Graph 1 illustrates the variation over time of the total family income12 of the “treated”,
control and reference groups in rural areas. As expected, there was a big jump in the family
income with the presence of eligible people after 1990. In 1988, the average family income
of that group was R$ 453, lower than the control group’s (R$ 582) and all other families’
income (R$ 507). There was a uniform increase for all groups in 1989 due to the country
economic growth and decrease in 1990 after a big economic recession13. In 1992 (after the
12in September 2002 Reais (R$).
13The real GDP growth rates in 1989 and 1990 were respectively 3.2% and -5.05%.
13reform), the “treated” group experiences a considerable growth in family income. On the
other hand, both the control group and all rural families had their income diminished. From
1993 to 1995, Brazil has grew on average 5% per year and that growth is exhibited in the
graph: all groups presented signiﬁcant increase (around 15%) in total family income during
the period. From 1988 to 1995, the “treated” group experienced a total family income growth
of 30.4% in real terms, while the income of the control group grew only 9.0% and just 1.3%
for all other rural families.
In graph 2, the “treated” group is broken into two diﬀerent groups, depending on the
gender of the eligible person. Both T m and T f groups’ incomes have very similar path
throughout the period. It is an indicative that uneven impacts of the reform for families
with a man or a woman pensioner cannot be credited only to diﬀerences in the family
income variation. It is more likely that such discrepancies have arisen due to divergences in
preferences of male and female recipients.14
As mentioned in section 3, the reform consisted in many diﬀerent changes in the law. With
the dataset available, we were able to disentangle the impacts of two sets of “treatments”:
(1) the eﬀect of the increase in the minimum beneﬁt (from half to one minimum wage) and
(2) the reduction in the age requirement in order to become eligible (from 65 to 60 years for
men and from 65 to 55 for women).
Graph 3 shows the variation of the total family income of both “treated” groups. Clearly,
the impact of the minimum beneﬁt increase starts right after the reform in 1992. The rise
in the total family income of the “old eligible” group was 30.2% in the ﬁrst year after the
reform, while the impact on family income of the new age eligibility rule was only suﬃcient
to oﬀset the signiﬁcant recession happened in the country in that period – the total family
income of that group was practically stable from 1990 to 1992. From 1992 to 1995, both
“treated” groups presented an increase in the family income. However, in this period the
growth in “newly eligible” group was much more signiﬁcant than the “old eligible” one. The
former has increased 30.6% and the latter only 6% in the period. The control and reference
groups experienced an increase of 17.2% and 16.2%, respectively.
The timing of family income boost for the “old eligible” group illustrates the impact of
the increase in the minimum beneﬁt value. Since the change in beneﬁt was automatic for
everyone already registered in the social security system, the eﬀect was immediate. On the
14As we will later see in the income regressions, the impact on the total family income, actually, was bigger to those with
an eligible female. We will also see that the impacts on the social outcomes were more pronounced to those families with an
eligible male, which reinforces the idea that preferences and bargaining power have a very important role in the intra-household
allocation.
14other hand, “newly eligible” individuals had ﬁrst to register in system before receiving the
beneﬁt. Disinformation, administrative delays, transportation costs to the near post oﬃce
could explain the postponement of the increase in the family income.
From 1988 to 1995, the total increases in the family income were 33.2% for the “old
eligible” group; 18.3% for the “newly eligible”; 4.9% for the control group and a decrease of
1.2% for the entire rural sector.
Graph 4 shows that the participation of the eligible person’s income in the total family
income has also increased in the period, and graph 5 illustrates that this increase has hap-
pened for both male and female recipients, but was more acute for women, since now the
system allows spouses to also be pensioners.
Table 3 shows the results of an OLS regression of model (3) where the dependent variable is
the total family income in logs. All control variable coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant and
have the expected sign. The total family income is higher if the head is older (with concavity),
more educated, male and white; families with more children also tend to have lower income.
It is also worthy noticing that all “treated” are poorer compared to the reference group,
indicating that the reform mostly impacted families in the bottom of the income distribution.
Looking now at the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence coeﬃcients, the results corroborate the evidence
found in the graphs above. The “treated” families have experienced a signiﬁcant growth in
their income after the reform. All β
j
4,i are strongly signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and from
their respective counterpart in the control group (β
j
5). Moreover, the coeﬃcients of the “old
eligible” groups (for both male and female pensioners) (β
j
4,k=2) are statistically signiﬁcantly
higher than the “newly eligible” ones (β
j
4,k=1). Once more, this could be an illustration of





4,k=2 are signiﬁcantly bigger than βm
4,k=1 and βm
4,k=2, indicating a
stronger eﬀect on income from the presence of an eligible females compared to the presence
of an eligible male. This was due to the new rules concerning the beneﬁts of spouses.
Impacts on Schooling and Health
Table (1 shows the evolution of the literacy and attendance and dispicts the improvement of
these schooling indicators in Brazil during the period for all groups of families. It illustrates
the fact that Brazil has been considerably improving its educational performance, especially
in the elementary level of schooling, since the beginning of the last decade.
In Brazil, the constitution establishes that the primary level of education (up to 8 years
15of schooling) should be freely provided by the municipalities and secondary level (9 to 11
years of schooling) by the states. Although it was possible for almost all children to ﬁnd
a public school within the state, transportation, uniform and other supplies costs impeded
the access of a considerable part of the children population. Moreover, since child labor
was not a rare phenomenon in rural Brazil, the opportunity cost of the forgone income was
also signiﬁcant. Threfore, we believe that the social security reform which had a signiﬁcant
impact on the families’ budget constraints is also behind the progress of those indicators
for the treated families. The increase of the schooling standards in Brazil reinforces the
importance of having a control group that correctly mimics the behavior of the treatment
group in the absence of the reform in order to consistently estimate its eﬀects.
Table 4 has the results of speciﬁcation (3) with schooling attendance or literacy as the
dependent variables. Columns (1a) and (1b) show the results for regressions with the entire
sample of children between 6 and 18 years old who live in rural areas. As expected, children
living in treated families are in general less likely to be literate and attending school, since
they are on average poorer families. Again, the coeﬃcients of the control variables are all
signiﬁcant with the expected sign, reﬂecting the results found in the income regressions.
Children living with an older, male, more educated and white head show better schooling
outcomes. By the same token, the number of children in the family has a negative impact
on education. The Post coeﬃcient captures the big positive trend in both attendance and
literacy in the period for the whole sample.
The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence coeﬃcients show that the presence of an eligible male in the
family had a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the schooling achievements. Children living
with a newly eligible male (T m
k=1) are 2.6% and 2.7% more likely to be literate and attending
school, respectively, while children with an old eligible male (T m
k=2) are also signiﬁcantly
more likely to attend school (2.7%). On the other hand, despite causing a bigger increase
in the family income, the presence of an eligible female does not seem to have improved the
schooling outcome of the children. Neither the presence of a newly (T
f
k=1) or an old (T
f
k=2)
eligible females has a positive eﬀect on literacy or attendance. Actually, the presence of an
old eligible female seems to decrease the likelihood of being literate.
Breaking the sample between boys and girls, we ﬁnd positive eﬀects in attendance for
both T m
k=1 and T m
k=2 boys. On the other hand, T m
k=1 girls is positive, suggesting that the there
was a beneﬁt in terms of literacy. Again, neither boys or girls beneﬁted form living with an
eligible female.
16Table 5 shows the results after splitting the sample into two diﬀerent subgroups: younger
children between 6 and 14 and older children between 14 and 18. It is clear that the ﬁrst
group beneﬁted much more from the reform than the second, especially the T m
k=1 children;
however, T m
k=2 older boys also suﬀered a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on attendance. Again,
children with an eligible female seem to have not beneﬁted from the reform, at least compared
to those in the reference group.
The last rows of each panel show the joint F-test if the presence of an eligible male is
signiﬁcant diﬀerent from the presence of an eligible female in the family. Panel (A) shows
the results for the regressions with the entire sample; Panel (B) and (C) show the results for
children between 6 and 14; and 14 and 18, respectively. We can see that in all samples the
presence of an eligible male had a signiﬁcantly bigger eﬀect than the presence of a female,
especially for boys’ attendance. These results indicate that the families are not pooling their
income and deciding the provision of those public goods based on the total family income; if
that were the case there would be no reason why the presence of an eligible male would have
a diﬀerent impact on schooling than the presence of an eligible female. Thus, the ﬁndings
contradict the core of the unitary model, i.e., the “neutrality” property.
Table 2) shows the proportion of people self-reported as ill and the proportion who have
looked for any health care service in two points of time, before and after the reform. Like
the schooling indicators, it displays a clear improvement on the heath indicators. In 1991,
the Brazilian government created the SUS (The Universal Health System), which proposed
to oﬀer free health care for virtually every citizen in the entire country. Before that, only
workers (and their dependents) who contributed to the social security system had access to
the public health system. Since the implementation of the SUS coincides with the reform in
the social security, our results could be very sensitive to it. The consistency of our estimation
hinges on the assumption that the impact of the SUS creation was uniform across treated
and control groups. Once again, this example also testiﬁes to the importance of having a
control group (like the almost-eligible families) as similar as possible to the treatment one.
Table 8 displays the results of speciﬁcation (2) having both health indicators (illness and
search for health care) as dependent variables. As expected, there is a negative relation
between the probability of being ill and the head’s schooling and gender; and the opposite
occurs in the case of health care search. There is negative correlation between age and
illness for children. In the case of middle-agers, the correlation turns positive. This U-
shaped relation between age and illness is acknowledged by the literature. In the case of
17search for health care services, there is a negative correlation with age for both children
and middle-agers. Again, the impact of the reform can be measured by the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence coeﬃcients (β
j
4,k). Looking at the results, we can see that the only signiﬁcant
impact of the reform was in the likelihood of being sick only for middle-agers who live with
an old eligible male. Compared to the reference group, all other groups seem to have suﬀered
no eﬀect from any of the other treatment groups.
The last row of table (9) tests whether there were diﬀerent eﬀects from the presence of
eligible males and females. Once more, middle-age people who live with an eligible male
signiﬁcantly15 beneﬁted more than those living with an eligible female.
Robustness Checks
As mentioned in section 4, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator is consistent only if reference
group has the same trend process as the treatment group in the absence of the treatment.
For that reason, we included in the regressions a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator for the
control group - families with an almost-eligible member - in order to capture a possible trend
associated with the presence of an elderly person in the family.
Table 6 shows the F-tests comparing the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence coeﬃcients of both treat-
ment against the control groups. Panel A has the tests for the entire sample while panels
(B) and (C) displays the tests for children between 6 and 14, and 14 and 18 years old, respec-
tively. Looking across the three diﬀerent panels, we observe that the results are, in general,
similar to those found when comparing to the reference group. The presence of eligible males
seems more valuable than eligible females; and children between 6 and 14 years old beneﬁted
more from the reform than the older ones. In the same way, the results shown on table 9
corroborate the ﬁndings about health: middle-agers living with a newly eligible male are
signiﬁcantly less likely to be ill after the reform.
One possible caveat of the intent-to-treat approach rises if the take-up ratios for males
and females are very diﬀerent from each other. In this case, all uneven impacts of males
and females shown in the main results could be driven by diﬀerences in the take-up ratios.
One way to test if that is the case is to see the eﬀects of the true treatment and compare
to the intent-to-treat ones. Deﬁning a treated group as the families that have a member
who is an eligible pensioner (i.e. there is a person in the family who receives a pension and
matches the age eligibility criteria), we run speciﬁcation 2 regressions using both deﬁnitions
15at 10% of signiﬁcance.
18of treatment. For both health and schooling, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between those
two strategies. The results are qualitatively very similar, showing again a much bigger eﬀect
from the male presence compared to the female. The results are available upon request.
Income × Bargaining Eﬀects
Case and Deaton (1998) show that one way to test if the pension income has the same impact
as any other income source is by doing the following decomposition of total family income
eﬀect on the outcome of interest:
ln[In + φIp] = ln[I + (φ − 1)Ip] ≈ ln(I) + (φ − 1)Ip/I (4)
where In is the family non-pension income; Ip is the pension income; and, I is the total
family income.
We then need to test if the coeﬃcient of the pension income share over the total family
income (Ip/I) is diﬀerent from zero. If that is the case, φ 6= 1 and, thus, the pension
money has a diﬀerent eﬀect on the public good provision than the rest of the family income.
Moreover, this speciﬁcation is also a direct test of the “neutrality” property of the public
good. Non-zero coeﬃcients on the income shares conﬁrm the inﬂuence of the bargaining
power in the decision-making process over the public good allocation within the family.
Table 7 shows the results of a regression with schooling attendance as the dependent
variable and total family income, male pension share, female pension share and all other
control variables. We can see that indeed the fractions of income provided by the pensioner
have a positive eﬀect on attendance, indicating the double impact of the reform on attendance
by, ﬁrstly, increasing total family income and secondly, increasing the bargaining power of the
pensioner, deﬁned by her share on total family income. The results shed light on the impact
diﬀerences of the reform depending on the gender of the recipient. It seems that, although
both men and women pensioners care more about education than the average adult member
of the family, especially for boys, eligible males manage to transform bargaining power in
actual provision more eﬃciently than females. This result is even more evident when we
reduce our sample to only treated families as shown in Panel (B). This could be driven not
only by diﬀerences in preferences, but it also possible that social norms or cultural models
make the male income share more relevant for concrete bargaining power inside the family.
It is possible that the results are capturing systematic diﬀerence between families that have
19only male pensioners compare to those that have only female pensioners. Nevertheless,
narrowing down our sample only to families with both female and male pensioners (Panel
(C)) does not change the main conclusion that male pension share is more important for
schooling attendance, especially for boys.
In the case of illness, the same conclusions arise. As expected total family income has
a negative eﬀect on the likelihood of being ill, and the male pension income share has a
signiﬁcant and bigger impact on the reduction of illness for middle-agers (table 10). Reducing
the sample only to treated families (Panel (B)) diminishes the precision of the estimators
without changing their signs.16 The same occurs in the sample including only families with
both male and female pensioners (Panel (C)).
6 Conclusion
The social security reform occurred in 1991 in Brazilian rural pension system has led to
an increase in schooling indicators for young children living with an eligible male. Boys are
more likely to attend school and girls to be literate. The reform has also negatively impacted
the probability of being ill on middle-age people living with a male pensioner. These uneven
results for the presences of male and female recipients are evidence that the unitary model of
household resource allocation does not represent the Brazilian poor rural families’ decision-
making process over their budget. The income is not pooled and provision of education and
health is not made based upon the total family resources. Moreover, we ﬁnd an indication
that the impact of the pension income on the schooling and health was higher than the
rest of the family resources. The increase in the bargaining power of the elderly, especially
males, may explain these ﬁndings, suggesting that they have stronger preferences toward
those outcomes. The results show the importance of targeting speciﬁc family members
in cash transfer programs in order to maximize the eﬀect on desirable outcomes. Although
families with an elderly person have on average low schooling and health indicator levels, cash
transfers to those members of the family have signiﬁcantly larger eﬀects than unconditional
transfers. In addition, since more than 10% of all children in rural areas live with an eligible
person, it is very plausible to attribute part of the success Brazil has achieved in the past
15 years in education and health, specially for poor families, to the social security reform of
1991.
16Except the coeﬃcient of the female pension share on the sample with only children.
20The ﬁndings have also great consequences for the design of conditional cash transfer
programs, such as Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Familia. Those programs directly create incentives
for schooling by requiring attendance. They set the mother as the receiver of the transfer. To
the best of my knowledge, there is no study providing evidence that this is the most eﬃcient
away (in the sense of maximizing the outcome of interest). Therefore, a more profound study
with the targeted families is necessary to identify speciﬁc members who may boost the direct
income eﬀect on schooling outcomes, enhancing the eﬀectiveness of the programs.
A straightforward extension for this paper is to measure the impact of the reform on
many other social outcomes, like child labor, fertility, anthropometrics, and other ﬁner health
indicators.
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24Figure 4: Fraction of family income provided by eligible/almost-eligible person
Figure 5: Fraction of total family income provided by eligible person (by gender)
25Table 1: Literacy and Attendance (in %)
Panel A: Literacy
Before reform After reform
1988 1989 1990 1992 1993 1995
Children w/ an eligible person 51.58 54.76 56.39 57.4 58.82 65.07
Children w/ a control group person 58.42 59.82 62.23 61.92 62.64 68.2
Other children 51.66 52.98 53.8 57.37 60.07 63.36
All Boys 48.04 50.68 50.82 53.51 55.97 59.59
All Girls 56.70 57.14 59.22 62.13 64.43 68.80
Panel B: Attendance
Before reform After reform
1988 1989 1990 1992 1993 1995
Children w/ an eligible person 58.16 58.42 59.41 64.51 66.07 71.51
Children w/ a control group person 58.72 58.19 60.06 60.85 63.04 70.64
Other children 64.92 65.1 64.51 68.02 72.63 76.14
All Boys 62.13 62.48 61.51 64.93 68.81 73.09
All Girls 64.86 64.94 65.48 68.88 72.97 77.08
% of children (≥ 5 and ≤ 15).
Table 2: Health Care and Illness (in %)
Panel A: Health Care
Before reform After reform
1986 1998
Everyone w/ an eligible person 8.77 11.11
Everyone w/ control group 7.46 9.47
Other people 7.76 9.1
Boys w/ an eligible person 6.73 8.3
Girls w/ an eligible person 10.82 14.15
Middle-agers w/ an eligible person 8.04 11.29
Panel B: Illness
Before reform After reform
1986 1998
Everyone w/ an eligible person 9.47 8.34
Everyone w/ control group 7.19 6.94
Other people 6.43 5.07
Boys w/ an eligible person 8.61 7.72
Girls w/ an eligible person 10.34 9.01
Panel A - % of people that looked for heath care in the past 2 weeks.
Panel B - % of people that claimed had had any health problem in the past 2 weeks.
















Male Treat.1× Post (βm
4,k=1) 0.151***
(0.0262)
Male Treat.2× Post (βm
4,k=2) 0.302***
(0.0166)
Male C. Group × Post (βm
5 ) -0.033
(0.0253)






















# Childr. ≤ 14 in the fam. -0.251***
(0.0033)
Head is white 0.215***
(0.0058)
N 87,386
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
∗∗∗ Signiﬁcant at 1% ; ∗∗ Signiﬁcant at 5%
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32Table 7: Bargaining eﬀect on attendance
All sample Boys Girls
Panel A: Entire Sample
Family Income (in logs) 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.019***
(0.0017) (0.0024) (0.0024)
Male pension / f. income 0.039*** 0.048** 0.03
(0.015) (0.0213) (0.0213)
Female pension / f. income 0.034** 0.031 0.034
(0.0169) (0.0249) (0.0231)
(H0: Male = Female Share) 0.005 0.017 0.004
(0.0345) (0.0542) (0.0478)
N 89,714 46,021 43,693
Panel B: Only treated families
Family Income (in logs) 0.04*** 0.037*** 0.042***
(0.0056) (0.0079) (0.008)
Male pension / f. income 0.128*** 0.134*** 0.122***
(0.0177) (0.0251) (0.0249)
Female pension / f. income 0.064*** 0.067** 0.058**
(0.0196) (0.0286) (0.0268)
(H0: Male = Female Share) 0.064* 0.067** 0.064
(0.0375) (0.0312) (0.0457)
N 12,000 6,120 5,880
Panel C: Only families with both eligible male and female
Family Income (in logs) 0.042*** 0.045*** 0.039**
(0.0124) (0.0174) (0.0177)
Male pension / f. income 0.107*** 0.163*** 0.05
(0.0365) (0.0534) (0.05)
Female pension / f. income 0.067 0.06 0.067
(0.0499) (0.0732) (0.0678)
(H0: Male = Female Share) 0.040 0.103** -0.017
(0.0564) (0.0497) (0.0785)
N 2,496 1,281 1,215
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































36Table 10: Bargaining eﬀect on illness
All sample Middle-agers Children
Panel A: Entire Sample
Family Income (in logs) -0.014*** -0.021*** -0.009***
(0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0003)
Male pension / f. income -0.002 -0.033** 0.006
(0.0049) (0.0163) (0.0079)
Female pension / f. income 0.013** -0.012 -0.001
(0.0054) (0.0203) (0.0076)
(H0: Male = Female Share) -0.015* -0.021** 0.007
(0.0094) (0.0112) (0.0023)
N 126,208 13,704 48,483
Panel B: Only treated families
Family Income (in logs) -0.022*** -0.02*** -0.008***
(0.0007) (0.0025) (0.0011)
Male pension / f. income -0.009 -0.024 0.008
(0.0055) (0.0189) (0.0088)
Female pension / f. income 0.005 -0.005 0.006
(0.0062) (0.0238) (0.0089)
(H0: Male = Female Share) -0.014 -0.019* 0.002
(0.0105) (0.0119 (0.0231)
N 28,714 2,092 5,302
Panel C: Only families with both eligible male and female
Family Income (in logs) -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.009***
(0.0012) (0.0083) (0.0025)
Male pension / f. income -0.019** -0.063 0.019
(0.0084) (0.0563) (0.0197)
Female pension / f. income 0.039*** 0.002 0.005
(0.0123) (0.0837) (0.0238)
(H0: Male = Female Share) -0.058** -0.065* 0.014
(0.0249) (0.0380) (0.0523)
N 10,426 271 1,045
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
∗∗∗ Signiﬁcant at 1%; ∗∗ Signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗ Signiﬁcant at 10%
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